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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff

will

address

the

arguments

contained

in

Appellees1 Brief (hereinafter "Def.Brief") under the same headings
as

contained

in

that

brief.

Those

same

references

and

abbreviations used in Plaintiff's Brief will be used in this reply
brief, including the following:
Declaration:
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions,
Restrictions and By-laws for Country Oaks Condominium;
Act: Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1
through 36;
Fourth Supplemental Declaration: Fourth Supplemental and
Amended Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and By-Laws for
Country Oaks Condominium.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
Defendants argue that only one issue is presented for

review and maintain the other issues raised by plaintiff were not
decided by the trial court.

Def. Brief, p.l.

An examination of

the issues presented for review by plaintiff indicates the trial
court did decide these "other" issues.
The first issue, stated on page 1 of Appellants' Brief,
is: "Is the recorded Declaration creating Country Oaks Condominium
binding on all unit owners?"

This issue was decided by the trial

court when the judge failed to apply the provisions of f 24.E of
the Declaration to the defendants. The effect of the trial court's
decision was to invalidate the Declaration and waive its provisions
as to defendants.
The second issue is: "Is there any form of private real
property ownership available within Country Oaks Condominium other
1

than in the form of a 'unit'?"

This issue was raised by plaintiff

at trial, R. 67, and was resolved by the trial court by its ruling
that defendants did not own units but owned a "right to build"
condominium units. R. 262. The weakness in this ruling is that a
right to build a condominium is a contract or personal property
right, not an ownership interest in real property.

If defendants

or their predecessors do possess a private real property ownership
interest in Country Oaks Condominiums in a form other than in a
unit, that interest needs to be clearly defined so the parties know
how and when liens attach to it and what interest and obligations
are transferred with it.

Such a ruling creates numerous problems

in using the Act to determine rights and obligations in other
situations.
The parties agree that the third issue is properly before
the court:

"Do Defendants/Appellees own units at Country Oaks

Condominium?"
The fourth issue is:

"If Defendants do not own units,

what real property interest do they hold title to at Country Oaks
Condominium?"

This issue is a continuation of the second issue.

It is also an issue that must be addressed if the Court rules
defendants

do

not

own

units

since

defendants

(or

their

predecessors) must own some form of real property interest in order
to possess what they claim is a right to build a unit on real
property at Country Oaks.
The last issue, cited in 5 2(e) on page 2 of appellant's
brief, addresses the conflict between the defendants who admitted
2

they owned units in their answer to the complaint and the trial
court's ruling that these defendants did not own units.1

The

trial court ruled on this issue when it ruled none of the
defendants owned units in spite of their admission to the contrary.
Defendants contend in their brief, page 1, that this
appeal does not apply to the remaining defendants who have chosen
not to respond to this appeal.
statement.

There is no basis for such a

Plaintiff addresses this issue at length under the

heading, "Which Parties Are Before This Court?" infra. Suffice it
to say here that the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment as to all defendants; there were no facts at issue
after the trial court denied plaintiff's motion

for summary

judgment, and plaintiff appealed that ruling to this Court.

This

appeal applies to all defendants.
III. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On page 11 of their brief, defendants represent plaintiff
consented to the entry of defendants' motion for summary judgement.
This is not an accurate representation of the stipulation entered
by the parties.

In the stipulation plaintiff specifically stated

it objected to the granting of summary judgement but consented to
the court entering a decision on defendants' motion based on the
1

This issue is stated as follows: "Three of the Defendants
did not contest the proceedings in the trial court except by
answering the complaint. In their answer these Defendants admitted
they owned the units in question. These three parties raised no
factual challenges to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Did
the trial court error in granting summary judgment against
Plaintiff when these three Defendants never challenged the claim
they owned units or presented any facts to the contrary?"
3

prior memorandum filed. R. 388.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paragraphs 6 and 9 of defendants1 statement of facts do

not contain facts but are legal conclusions and arguments.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On page 15 of their brief, defendants state that between

1978 and 1989 "no one has ever thought to treat a right to develop
units as meaning that one is in fact a unit owner." Two points are
relevant

in response to this statement.

First, defendants1

predecessor, the declarant, was in control of the condominium
during its initial years of development.
bill

itself

for common expenses.

The declarant did not

This practice started

tradition of nonpayment by the declarant.

a

Second, the declarant

and its successors cannot wait indefinitely before they should pay
for common expenses incurred in connection with their units.

As

shown by the affidavit of plaintiff, R.88, over $29,000.00 in
common expenses which had nothing to due with repair to buildings
were incurred during the 1989-90 fiscal year.

These common

expenses were incurred to resurface streets, clean up vacant
property and conduct weed control directly affecting or contiguous
to defendants1 units.2
2

Defendants state on page 12 of their brief that roads do
not lead in front of all of defendants1 units. Of the 21 units at
issue herein, paved roads, paid for and maintained solely by the
plaintiff are in front of 17 units. The remaining 4 units are at
the end of a dead-end road and have not been paved due to the lack
of development by defendants.
4

Defendants

further maintain

(Def. Brief p.15) that

plaintiff wants defendants to pay for common expenses incurred in
connection
Condominium.

with

buildings

already

located

at

Country

Oaks

As pointed out above, there are substantial costs

associated with unimproved units because of the necessity of
maintaining the streets and grounds that abut those units.

It

appears what defendants really want is for plaintiff to continue
paying for common expenses incurred by plaintiff in connection with
defendants' unimproved units.

Defendants' obligation is the same

as every other owner at Country Oaks, which obligation is to pay
the proportionate share of common expenses as defined in the
Declaration.

Declaration, § 11. R. 287. Addendum, Exhibit "A".

The issue as to which common expenses are incurred in
relation to improved units as opposed to unimproved units was
brought to a head in the trial court when defendants filed a motion
in limine. R. 342. Defendants sought to "prohibit" any testimony
from plaintiff regarding common expenses incurred by plaintiff in
connection with such things as hourly wages, equipment, vacant lots
and various administrative expenses.

Defendants asserted that

those common expenses "which should, as to all or part, be shared
in proportionate amount by defendants, are the items which have to
do with the grounds and streets."

R. 344.

As Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine points
out, R. 354, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between
common expenses incurred in connection with an improved unit as
opposed to an unimproved unit. For example, defendants receive the
5

benefit of the hourly wages paid to workers who maintain the entire
common area, including the common area

immediately

adjoining

defendants1 parcels3 where weeds grow and snow is removed.

Thus

the need to include in an assessment against defendants those
hourly wages incurred as a common expense which benefit defendants.
Defendants receive the benefit of equipment purchased for use by
the hourly workers to control weeds and make repairs on and around
Defendants1 parcels; thus the need to include equipment as a common
expense.
with

Without incurring administrative expenses in connection

the

condominium

association, the

association

could

not

function and defendants would not even have a viable entity to be
part of when defendants do decide to improve their units.
Because there are costs associated with the ownership of
a unit, whether improved or not, the Act and the Declaration define
how those costs are to be divided among all owners, i.e., as common
expenses in proportion to the percentage interest stated in the
Declaration.

Defendants

have

admitted

in

the

trial

court

proceedings that they would (answer, R. 51) and should (motion in
limine, R.

344) pay

for some of the common expenses.

The

Declaration and its amendments define that amount.4
3

Parcel is a term defined in U.C.A. § 57-8-27(1) to include
each unit and its percentage of undivided interest in the common
areas and facilities, but excLuding buildings and property. This
raises an interesting question. Since a parcel includes a unit but
does not include a building, isn't it possible to have a unit
without a building?
4

The irony of defendants' admission that they should pay
only a portion of the common expenses associated with what
defendants characterize as a right to build a unit, is that the
portion of common expenses they should pay is defined in the Fourth
6

In footnote 1 on page 15 of defendants' brief, defendants
state there is as issue about defendant LaWanna R. Packer, Trustee
(hereinafter "Packer").

It is claimed Packer sold her unit under

contract to defendant Kaiserman and that her right is solely to
receive funds.

Not only is no such claim part of the record nor

was it raised at trial; it is directly contrary to the answer filed
by Packer's first attorney, Jamis M. Johnson. In her answer Packer
admits she is the owner of units 15 and 16 of phase 7-2 as alleged
in plaintiff's complaint. Even though she may have sold her units
under contract, she remained the fee simple owner of the unit.5
Packer further claims because she is not an owner she cannot be
liable to plaintiff.
plaintiff's action.

Such a position overlooks the nature of
Plaintiff filed this action to foreclose a

lien for common expenses, which foreclosure would end Packer's
interest in the units (whether that interest is a personal property
interest or a real property interest) since she is the record fee
owner of the property.
Finally, Packer asks the Court for leave to file an
answer, suggesting that she may not have filed one. Packer is very

Supplemental Declaration,
appellant's brief.

appendix

5

B.

See

Exhibit

"G" to

A unit owner is defined as a person owning a unit in fee
simple. U.C.A. § 57-8-3(28). The Utah Supreme Court in Butler v.
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), stated that the seller under
a contract retains fee title in the seller's name:
"The term
'vendor's lien' seems to have stuck even though it is inaccurately
used before the vendor parts with the title. Until then, it is
not, in fact, a lien at all, but rather a retained interest in the
land that is derived from the vendor's retention of the fee title."
(cite omitted). Id. at 1256 n. 6.
7

much aware that she retained Attorney Jamis M. Johnson to represent
her and to file an answer on her behalf. That is precisely what he
did. For any number of reasons, Packerfs answer may not have found
its way into the trial court's file, but Packer is not prejudiced
by that failure. Plaintiff received a copy of Packer's answer and
relied upon that pleading.

Packer does not represent she did not

retain Attorney Johnson to file an answer for her or that he did
not represent her as agreed. Packer should not be granted leave of
court to answer a complaint that has already been answered. If she
is permitted to file an answer in the appellate court, it should be
the exact answer previously sent to plaintiff.
VI.

WHICH PARTIES ARE BEFORE THIS COURT?
After filing its complaint, plaintiff received an answer

filed in behalf of defendants Jones, Came and Avery, and an answer
filed in behalf of defendants Packer, Kaiserman, Ferrante and GTT
Investments.

R. 48. Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "A".

Defendants

Jones, Came and Avery denied they owned units but offered to pay
some of the common expenses associated with their interest at
Country Oaks. R. 51.

Defendants Packer, Kaiserman, Ferrante, and

GTT Investments admitted they owned units but claimed because the
units were not improved they should not be required to pay common
expenses associated with those units. Plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment against all the defendants.

R.

54.

Four

defendants (Jones, Carne, Avery and Packer) chose to respond to the
motion

and

three

defendants

Investments) did not respond.

(Kaiserman,

Ferrante

and

GTT

The trial court denied plaintiff's
8

motion for summary judgment as to all defendants, ruled as a matter
of law that none of the defendants owned units, and ordered a trial
on the issue of a reasonable amount that should be paid to
plaintiff because three defendants had offered to pay some of the
common expenses associated with their interest at Country Oaks
Condominium.
As to the four defendants who had not offered to pay some
of the common expenses, the trial court proceeding was concluded
when plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, since
these defendants had made no such offer; therefore no facts were
left in dispute, and the trial court had ruled as a matter of law
they did not own units.

Since plaintiff had not sought an

equitable remedy against these defendants and they had not offered
to pay any common expenses, there was no claim before the court for
trial.6

As to the defendants who had offered to pay some of the

common expenses, trial was set.

By stipulation and pursuant to a

motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Jones, Came, Avery
and Packer, the issues set for trial were resolved.

R. 385, 387.

So which parties are involved in this appeal?

All the

parties, contrary to the assertion of defendants on page 20 of
their brief.

Plaintiff is appealing the denial of its motion for

summary judgment as well as those other orders as set forth in the
6

The trial court documents do not distinguish between one
defendant or another. One thing that is clear is that the decision
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment applied to all
defendants. R. 254. Appellant's brief, exhibit "D." Attorney
Johnson then withdrew as counsel, R. 340, 341. Plaintiff sent a
Notice to Appoint Other Counsel or Appear in Person, R. 347, which
was ignored by defendants.
9

docketing statement. Even though all the defendants have not filed
briefs with this Court, they are all subject to the Court's ruling
on this appeal. To permit any one defendant to prevail at trial or
on an appeal by simply refusing to participate in the proceedings
is no different than permitting a baseball team to win by refusing
to play the game. All defendants are before the Court.
Defendants ask the question of whether plaintiff is
"contending that an unfilled (sic) Answer by parties who have not
participated in this case are in some way binding on the Appellees
herein?" Def. Brief, p. 20. Plaintiff is categorically contending
that any answer filed by any party is binding on that party.

In

other words, those defendants who admitted they owned units are
bound by that admission.

For the trial court to rule otherwise is

reversible error since there was no other factual basis upon which
the court could base such a ruling.7
Plaintiff has never stated the trial court committed
reversible error regarding the form of the order it signed as
suggested by defendants on page 21 of defendants' brief.

Such a

statement by defendants misconstrues the facts and does not deal
with the same ruling or issue referred to by plaintiff in its
brief.
VII. KEY DECLARATION PROVISIONS
In drafting a declaration to create a condominium it is
essential to clearly and definitively describe which portions of
7

Plaintiff recognizes the question of when a unit exists
also presents a question of law.
10

the condominium

constitute common area, limited common area,

buildings, units and land.

In both the Declaration and Fourth

Supplemental Declaration, the following five headings are found: 1)
Description of Land, 2)
Description

of Units, 4)

Facilities, and 5)
Facilities.

General Description of Buildings, 3)
Description

of

Common Areas and

Description of Limited Common Areas and

The Act requires these five areas to be described in

the Declaration.

U.C.A. § 57-8-10(2)(a)-(e).

Whenever repairs

are needed or costs are incurred within a condominium, to prevent
confusion it needs to be clear whether the expense or repair is the
responsibility of the unit owner or whether it is a common expense.
This

gives

insight

into

one

of

the

important

reasons

the

legislature required the descriptions within each of these five
areas.

Defendants1 premise that a unit does not exist until it is

improved is based upon a narrow reading of one portion of one of
these five descriptions.
Defendants chose certain paragraphs out of one of the
five headings referred to above and ignored others that provide a
complete

picture

of the

relationship

Declaration have with each other.

these

sections

in the

For example, defendants quoted

in their brief, p. 17, the first six paragraphs under the heading
"Description
paragraphs.

of

Units."

Defendants

omitted

the

final

two

Paragraph 8, as found on page 9 of the Declaration,

reads in its entirety as follows:
8. Every contract for the sale of a unit and every
other instrument affecting title to the unit may describe
that unit by its identifying number or symbol as
designated in the map or maps with the appropriate
11

reference to the map(s) and to the Declaration, as each
shall appear on the record of the County Recorder of
Davis County, Utah. Such description will be construed
to describe the Unit, together with the appurtenant
undivided interest in the common areas and facilities,
and to incorporate all the rights incident to ownership
of a unit and all the limitations on such ownership as
described in the Declaration, including all appurtenant
undivided interests and all rights and limitations
arising as a result of an expansion of the project
pursuant to paragraph 24 of this Declaration, (emphasis
added).
Even under defendants1 theory that the instrument they
received was a "right to build" a unit, that instrument is
"construed to describe a unit" and incorporates all the rights and
limitations of ownership described in the Declaration, including
the obligation to pay common expenses.
The

difficulty

in

attempting

to

use

the

language

contained under the five headings, referred to above, to resolve
the issue before the court arises when it becomes clear that these
five headings were included for descriptive purposes and were not
included for the purpose of defining what a unit is or when it is
created.

A building is not described as a unit.

described under separate headings.
limited common area or a building.

The two are

A unit is not described as
Each of these areas is

separately described since they have separate characteristics and
qualities. That portion of the Declaration intended to define (and
not describe) what each of these areas are, is found in section 2
of the Declaration.
On page 16 of defendants1 brief, defendants quote in part
from section 2.P of the Declaration, wherein "common areas and
facilities" is defined.

Defendants omit two sections of the
12

definition that are relevant in this analysis.

One of those

omitted sections is § 2.P.3 of the Declaration, which defines the
following as part of the common area:

"All foundations, columns,

girders, beams, supports, main walls, roof..." While these items
are clearly contained in a building, if a building exists, they are
just as clearly not part of a unit since they are common area.
Having a building does not mean a unit exists.8
The other omitted section is § 2.P.4 of the Declaration,
which includes within the common area the following: "Those common
areas and facilities specifically set forth and designated as such
in the map." The "map" referred to is "the record of survey map of
Country Oaks Condominiums, recorded herewith by Declarant in
accordance with Utah Code Annotated, § 57-8-13 (1953 as amended)."
Declaration, f 2(G), R. 273. That map, as it relates to the units
in question herein, is shown as exhibit "I" to appellant's brief.
The record of survey map unmistakenly defines the land where units
are located as being privately owned and not part of the common
area.

The record of survey map shows all property to be common

area except where units are located.

That property is identified

as "PRIVATE OWNERSHIP."9
8

Defendants argue that "Land is part of the common area and
is not part of a unit."
Def. Brief, p. 17.
But roofs,
foundations, walls and beams are also part of the common area. An
observation that land is part of the common area adds nothing to a
resolution of the issue before the court and is not accurate to the
extent land is "privately owned," as set forth on the map.
9

Defendants claim that because there are no buildings on
their land, Def. Brief p. 18, they cannot own units. Such an
argument completely overlooks the nature of defendants1 private
ownership interest in their units at Country Oaks.
Defendants
13

Even the definition of "unit11 quoted by defendants, Def.
Brief, p. 18, indicates defendants1 fee simple interest is not
owned in common with the other unit owners at Country Oaks.
Defendants quote paragraph 2(H) of the Declaration which defines
unit as
that part of the property owned in fee simple for
independent use and shall include the elements of the
condominium property which are not owned in common with
the owners of the other units as shown on the map.
(emphasis in the original).
Are defendants fee simple owners of property?

Yes.

Is

that property for independent use? Yes, defendants may use it for
its intended purpose at any time in accordance with the terms or
the Declaration.

Is defendants' property owned in common with the

other owners of units as shown on the map? No, the map clearly
indicates defendants' property is subject to private ownership and
is not owned in common.

There is no conclusion to draw but that

defendants' interest in Country Oaks Condominium consists of a
private ownership interest in units.
VIII. SECTION 24 OF THE DECLARATION.
Defendants correctly assert that '"plaintiff's main point
in this appeal is based upon § 24 of the Declaration."
p. 18.

Def. Brief

Section 24.E identifies the time at which a unit becomes

subject to the terms of the Declaration and any supplemental
possess that interest whether they own an improved or an unimproved
unit. It also overlooks the definition of "condominium project"
which includes "a plan or project whereby two or more units,
whether contained in existing or proposed apartments,...are
separately offered for sale." U.C.A. § 57-8-3(7).
(emphasis
added).
14

declarations that may be filed thereafter.
the question:

Section 24.E answers

When is a unit created so as to become subject to

the terms of the Declaration?

If we know when a unit is created so

as to become subject to the terms of the Declaration, it is an
elementary process to determine who the unit owner is for purposes
of assessment of common expenses.
Rather than address the substance of the language in
Section 24.E, defendants deal with this issue in one sentence
within one paragraph by stating what Section 24.E does not say as
opposed to analyzing what it does say.

Def. Brief p. 20.

The

Declaration could not be more clear in stating when new units are
subject to condominium ownership and subject to the terms of the
Declaration.

Section 24.E states that "The new units shall be

subject to [the] . . .Declaration, and. . .to condominium ownership with
all

the

incidents

supplemental

map

uncontroverted

and

that

pertaining

thereto...,

supplemental
the

upon

filing

Declaration...."

supplemental

map

and

the

It is
the

Fourth

Supplemental Declaration were filed in 1978. The fact defendants
were not assessed for common expenses sooner only means they
enjoyed 11 years of ownership without having to share in the common
expenses incurred in connection with their units.
IX.

THE ISSUE OF THE WARRANTY DEEDS.
Defendants Jones, Cam,

Avery and Packer argue the

declarant only sold to them the "right to built" units and did not
sell units.

This argument is premised on the theory that the

declarant could not sell that which it did not own. Nowhere is it
15

established that a declarant owns a "right to build" units as
opposed to "owning" units. When a declarant transfers its interest
in a condominium project to a grantee, the grantee then stands in
the shoes of the declarant and possesses the same interest the
declarant possessed. Declaration, p. 3. R. 272. The question then
becomes:

What interest does a declarant own after it creates a

condominium by subjecting all the real property described in the
Declaration to the terms of the Declaration?

A declarant cannot

own common area since there is no private ownership of common area
in a condominium and common area cannot be made subject to an
action for partition or division. U.C.A. § 57-8-7(3). A declarant
owns "units, whether contained in existing or proposed apartments."
U.C.A. § 57-8-3(7) (emphasis added). Units are precisely what the
declarant

that

created

Country

Oaks

Condominium

owned

and

transferred to defendants by warranty deed.
Even

if, arguendo, the declarant

and

some

of the

defendants were successful in reversing the transaction wherein
declarant gave defendants warranty deeds to units, the units would
not disappear and cease to exist. Declarant would become the owner
of the units at issue.

This makes the issue of when units become

subject to the terms of the Declaration all the more critical since
the declarant drafted the Declaration, had it recorded, and thus
created the units the declarant sold to defendants.

Furthermore,

to accept defendants1 claim that they did not receive deeds to
units but only intended to receive a "right to build" units, means
the declarant's ability to convey a warranty deed to a unit is
16

somehow conditioned upon defendants performing an act over which
the declarant has no control.10
The property rights at issue in any condominium are too
critical to permit the declarant or any other single party to
determine who owns what rights.

Those rights are defined in the

Declaration and publicly recorded for the benefit of all current
and future unit owners.

After the Declaration is recorded, the

declarant is governed by its provisions as are the other owners.
The only reserved rights given to a declarant are those dealing
with appointment to members to the management committee.

Those

reserved rights are terminated no later than six years from the
recording

of the

Declaration

in the

case

of

an

expandable

condominium such as County Oaks, U.C.A. 57-8-16.5(1)(a).
X.

CASE DISCUSSION,
Rather

than

rebrief

cases

that

speak

clearly

for

themselves, plaintiff makes note of two points: first, the Wellebv
case, Def. Brief p. 23, clearly turned on the scrivener's choosing
to make the object of assessments "condominium parcels," as opposed
to "units." Had the object of assessments been units, the result
very likely would have been the result seen in Hyde, as cited in
plaintiff's brief. Which leads to the second point, all the cases
cited by the parties herein have turned on the language of the
declarations involved.

None of the cases cited contained a

10

It is not claimed by defendants that the declarant never
owned units. That issue is ignored while defendants claim they
received the right to build units without stating what interest in
the condominium project the declarant owns or owned.
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provision similar to section 24.E of the Declaration which defines
when units become subject to the terms of the Declaration.
XI.

MISCELLANEOUS POINTS.
In paragraph 2 on pages 28 and 29 of defendants' brief,

defendants state in response to plaintiff's claim that defendants
admitted in their answer to an obligation to pay common expenses:
The defendants had offered to pay some reasonable sum in
settlement or pursuant to a possible amendment to the
pleadings by plaintiff to assert unjust enrichment or
some similar remedy.
There is no basis for such a stcitement by Defendants.
While it is true settlement offers were made all through these
proceedings, such is not admissible nor relevant.

Defendants

stated of their own accord in their answer to plaintiff's complaint
the following:
Defendants have said they are willing to pay and remain
willing to pay a reasonable sum to cover other expenses
related to their right to develop land within the
condominium project.
Defendants' answer, third defense, R. 51.
Such an admission was not the result of settlement
negotiations or the result of discussions regarding amending the
pleading to assert a cause of action for unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff views this offer as an admission of defendants possessing
an ownership interest in units at Country Oaks and the concomitant
obligation to pay a percentage of the common expenses.
XII. CONCLUSION
The Declaration is clear in defining when units come into
18

existence.

Units exist for all purposes and possess all the

incidents of ownership when the supplemental map and Declaration
are recorded.

Defendants have owned units since the time they

received deeds to units from their predecessors.
One of the incidents of ownership associated with owning
a unit is the obligation to pay common expenses associated with
ownership of a unit.

Substantial common expenses have been

incurred in connection with defendants1 units, which they equitably
and legally ought to pay.
obligation

to

pay

Some defendants have admitted on

a portion

of

the

common

Declaration states precisely what portion

expenses.

The

(percentage) of the

common expenses defendants are required to pay.

Since defendants

have failed to pay any common expenses in connection with the units
they own, their interest should be foreclosed as provided by law.
Wherefore, plaintiff asks the court to reverse the order
of the trial

court and

enter a judgment as prayed

for in

plaintiff's complaint.
DATED this

nil

O^

day of October, 1991.

RICHARD/W. JONES
Attorney^ for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

727
The management committee shall be responsible
for the controlf operation and management of the project
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, this Declaration and such administrative, management and operation rules,
and regulations as it may adopt from time to time as herein
provided, and all agreements and determinations lawfully
made and entered into by the committee.
The management committee shall have the authority
to provide such facilities, in addition to those for which
provision has already been made, as it may deem to be in
the best interest of the unit owners and to effect the necessary amendment of documents and maps in connection therewith.
The management committee shall be known by such
name or designation as it, or the unit owners, at any meeting
may assign,
10.

CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP.
Whenever there is a change of ownership of a

residental unit and its appurtenant rights, for whatever
reason, the management committee or the manager may require
as condition to recognizing the new unit owner or owners as
such, that the new unit owner or owners furnish evidence
substantiating the new ownership.
11.

ASSESSMENTS.
Every unit owner shall pay his proportionate

share of the common expenses, which share shall be equal
to the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas
and facilities as set forth in Appendix B, as amended, from
time to time as provided in paragraph 24 of this Declaration.
Payment thereof shall be in such amounts and at such times
as the management committee determines in accordance with
the Act, the Declaration or the By-Laws.

There shall be a

